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Massey University,
Jing Chi 
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Massey University
China’s short stock market history has already seen three merger waves, yet little is known of 
the performance drivers of acquirers. Using an acquirer’s announced target value as the proxy 
of the firm’s acquiring capacity, the link between that and its operational and/or financial 
conditions was investigated. Cash reserve ratio was significant in determining capacity: a firm 
with a higher cash ratio will, on average, take a larger target firm in both absolute value and 
relative measure. A larger acquirer size is associated with a larger takeover size, but a lesser 
target ratio is relative to the size of the acquirer. Firms’ debt and profitability ratios do not 
explain the target size.
Introduction
Merger and acquisition have been widely used as a corporate tool in developed 
Western countries; but were not prevalent in China until 1987 when the first Chinese merger 
wave came. With the development of the Chinese stock market and the reform of Chinese
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state-owned enterprises, China experienced its second merger wave from 1991 to 1996 and its 
third wave from 2003 to 2006; but still little is known about the major operational or financial 
characteristics that motivated those firms taking merging and acquisition action in China. We 
have initiated here an investigation to fill the gap.
M&A have increasingly captured the attention of public policy makers, corporate 
managers and financial investors. Past literature about the relation between acquisition 
behavior and bidders’ financial characteristics is extensive, but not many scholars have 
studied the situation in China. The purpose in this study was, therefore, to investigate the 
acquiring capacity of a firm. In particular we test the effect of a firm’s financial 
characteristics on its acquisition capacity by using the absolute size of the acquisition and the 
relative size of the acquisition as proxies. This method has never been used in previous 
literature. This method, measuring the difference in target size as an indicator for acquirers’ 
takeover capacity, is different from the traditional Logit model which measures the difference 
between bidders and non-bidders. Although the two models take different forms in regression, 
we have assumed that the difference is in degree, not in fimdamental nature. We tried to use 
the available theories explaining the motivations of takeover to explain why a firm chooses a 
larger size takeover. The traditional Logit model is also employed for comparison.
By examining Chinese acquisition cases between 2001 and 2006, this research report 
presents new evidence on M&A in China. The OLS regression approaches confirm that 
bidders higher cash reserve tend to acquire larger firms in both terms of absolute value and 
relative target ratio. It is also confirmed that bidders with larger size tend to acquired larger 
firms but smaller in relative target ratio. The results are extension of existing evidence of 
describing the likelihood of a firm taking acquiring action. The other hypotheses of 
operational performance and debt capacity are not supported by our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I, we briefly review 
the literature and in section II we describe the development of mergers and acquisitions in 
China. In Section III we develop and discuss the models used in the study and section IV 
contains the empirical results. Finally we draw conclusions in section V.
I. Literature review
Previous literature has provided a clear picture of incentives for merger and 
acquisition, which have been the primary vehicles for value creations (Jarrell, Brickley and 
Netter (1988); Jenson and Ruback (1983)). The motivations can be summarized as follows: 
1) synergistic gain by merging the resources of two firms (Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988)); 2) 
exploitation of asymmetric information between acquiring firms’ managers and acquiring or 
target firms’ shareholders; 3) solution to agency problems associated with free cash flow; 4) 
increase of market shares; 5) gaining of tax benefits; 6) reduction of financial risk and 
avoidance of bankruptcy (Kumar and Rajib (2007)). Furthermore, some researchers state 
that merger and acquisition is also motivated by misevaluation of the target firms or stock 
market or managers’ empire-building preference (Roll (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
and Jenson (1986)). Recently, Folta and O’Brien (2008) provide a threshold model to describe 
the merging and acquisition behavior of management which will tolerate a negative abnormal 
return. The prediction is consistent to their pursuit for best long-term interest of shareholders.
There are many motives for M&A and certain characteristics make firms more likely 
to become involved in M&A. A similar stimulus could affect their choice of target size. More 
operational and financial synergy could be a good reason for acquiring a larger sized target.
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The agency problem and tax advantage can very likely explain discrepancies in the sizes of 
the parties in a takeover. If acquisition is motivated by a certain financial rationale, then the 
acquirers should indicate some special characteristics of their actions that explain this size 
difference.
The study of financial characteristics started in the early 1960s; when researchers 
focused mainly on the likelihood of being targeted by comparing the financial characteristics 
of acquired firms to those of the non-acquired firms. According to these investigations, 
smaller sized firms, and those with lower earning ratios and growth rate, poor liquidity and 
less debt were more likely than others to become targets (Monroe and Simkowitz (1971); 
Harris et al. (1982); Palepu (1986); and Kumar and Rajib (2007)). However, some empirical 
tests display an opposing view on a few ratios. For instance, Wansley (1984) and Owen 
(1995) observed that target firms have higher growth potential and more liquidity than 
non-target firms.
While plenty of researchers investigated the profitability of firms that have been 
acquired, there are not many such empirical papers that test the acquiring firms. Trahan and 
Shawky (1992) made an attempt in this area. They selected 1163 US-listed firms that engaged 
in manufacturing and mining industries and completed their acquisitions between 1984 and 
1986. By utilizing Logit probability models to compare bidders* and non-bidders’ financial 
ratios, their results suggest that firms with larger size and longer history that paid a large 
proportion of earnings out as dividends have greater probability of engaging in acquisitions 
than do others. However, there is no other significant relationship between the bidder’s 
characteristics and the likelihood of acquisition to be found in the paper. Sorensen (2000), 
who studied the characteristics of acquirers, targets and non-merger firms, documents that 
acquiring firms are more profitable than target and non-merging firms. His findings confirm 
that modem mergers are primarily motivated by companies with above average margins 
seeking profit improvement by rapid expansion of sales.
Recently, Pasirous and Gaganis (2007) examined the financial characteristics of 47 
acquirers that were involved in acquisitions in the Asian commercial banking sector over the 
period 1998 to 2004. By employing the binary logistic model, they found that the 
probability of making an acquisition increases with the bidder’s size and cost efficiency, 
proxied by cost to income ratio and profitability. However, after partitioning the sample into 
two sub-periods (1998-2000; 2001-2004), only size remained significant. Also, Kumar and 
Rajib (2007) compared 227 acquirers to 215 target firms in India and reported that the 
acquiring firms tended to have higher P/E ratios, higher book values, higher cash flows, and 
higher values of liquid assets, but lower leverage than the target firms.
As the literature is focused mainly on the UK and US markets, what determines 
acquisition behavior in China has not yet been conclusively demonstrated, nor do there appear 
to be any especially Chinese characteristics in acquisition activities, particularly since China 
has become a member of the WTO. This study is designed to shed some light on the question. 
Additionally, we propose a new proxy for the acquiring capacity of a firm. We use the actual 
market value announced by acquirers of a targeted firm as an indication of its acquiring 
capacity. This proxy of target size has not been used in previous literature. We argue that it 
might be an alternative to the dummy variable used in the Logit model to measure acquiring 
behavior. Based on the assumption that higher take over capacity firms will have a tendency 
to select larger firms for acquisition; the announced value of the targeted firm could be used 
as an indicator to measure an acquirer’s degree of aggressiveness in the action and thus its
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acquiring capacity. With this measure, the study is unique and the results are interpreted based 
upon this assumption.
II. Merger and acquisitions in China
Although merger and acquisition programs already have a long history in the West, 
they are relatively new in China. Since 1987, the first merging wave occurred mainly in a few 
cities, with total transactions of $32.1 million. But in the second wave, the M&A activities 
expanded to the whole country and the transactions dramatically totaled $5.27 billion between 
1991 and 1996 (Koplyay and Fu (2001)). Since 2001, China’s joining the WTO has brought 
more pressures to bear on Chinese firms and made them feel that it is more difficult to 
succeed in this highly competitive market. Thus, how to expand market shares and compete in 
the global market have become the most urgent questions for Chinese firms. In these 
circumstances, M&A, which is known as an effective expanding strategy, has been considered 
as a good choice for many firms. (Cefis, Marsili, and Schenk (2009) have explained the mechanism of 
the external firm growth due to mergers and acquisitions and provided their evidence on the firm size issue.) 
Moreover, with the implementation of state-owned shares restructuring and the reform of 
share ownership divisions, China experienced its third merging wave in the period after 2003, 
which was the most active stage for M&A in Chinese history.
In the earlier period, all the acquisition activities were paid for in cash. It was not imtil 
1998 that equity payment was first used in China. Although this new method avoids risky 
cash transactions, it was still unpopular then in China’s M&A because equity payment 
involves issuing new shares, which causes dilutions and reduced acquirers’ EPS and net assets 
per share. Besides, shareholders of target firms may sell the stocks immediately after 
receiving them and this will decrease bidders’ share price greatly. Moreover, as equity 
payment was just beginning, the regulations and guidelines in this area were still incomplete 
and incompetent. Therefore, cash payment remains the most commonly used method of 
settlement in acquisition activities.
III. Acquisition models
We have assumed that there exists a certain type of probability for corporations’ 
acquiring behavior. We have also assumed that a firm’s acquisition probability is related to its 
operational and financial conditions. This belief is based mainly upon the merging and 
acquisition theories of operational and financial synergies. The higher a potential synergy 
exists in a firm, the higher the chance that the firm will take action to acquire another firm. 
We can have a function (F) in the form of
Acquiring ProbabiHty (T) = F (operational and financial ratios of a firm, T-1).
The acquiring probability of a firm to acquire another firm in the next time period (T) 
is a function of some current (T-1) operational and financial ratios of the firm.
This probability is not observable directly, but it is possible to measure it through 
some observable proxies or actions of a firm, for example by its action of making an acquiring 
announcement and/or realizing an acquisition.
Past researchers have all used this acquiring probability in their studies. In contrast to 
all of them we have tried to explore the answers to other inquiries: if a firm takes the action of 
acquiring, what is the appropriate size it usually takes? What elements determine this 
acquisition size? Is there any observable relation between the acquired size and an acquirer’s 
financial positions? We could not find any literature concerning this relation, so this study is 
the first attempt to answer these questions.
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The first hypothesis we can develop concerns the relation between a firm’s financial 
liquidity and the size of the firm to be acquired. Higher liquidity makes it easier for a firm to 
finance an acquisition at a lower cost. The second hypothesis is about a firm’s debt level. The 
higher the debt level of an acquirer (and thus higher financial risk), the higher will be the 
financing cost of takeover action. The third relation we have explored deals with a firm’s 
profitability. We argue that a higher profitability firm has more growth opportunity, and if it 
decides to acquire another firm, it will target a firm of larger size. The last relation we have 
tested in this study concerns the size of an acquirer. The relation is that relatively larger firms 
possess stronger financial capacity and can afford higher values of acquisition. To test these 
relations we have used both absolute acquisition value and relative ratio of acquired value 
against the acquirer value to perform the following tests.
We have tested the following two models in the study:
Probability (acquisition)
= F (CurrentRatio, Cash, D/A, FirmSize, NPM, ROA, FixAssets) (1)
and
Acquired Size (or target value to acquirer value ratio)
= a  + pi CurrentRatio + P2 Cash + P3 (D/A) + P4 FirmSize 
+ p5 NPM + Pe ROA + P7 FixAssets + Acquire Tj^e Dummies (2)
The dependent variable in Model (1) is assigned the value of one if the firm has 
announced an intention to acquire and zero otherwise and a Logit model is used (which has 
been widely used in the literature). It compares the financial characteristics of bidders to those 
of non-bidders.
In Model (2) we use either absolute size (target value) or relative size (target 
value/acquirer value) as the dependent variable. A pooled data regression is used to estimate 
the parameters.
The major variables used in the models are described in the following hypotheses:
A. Liquidity hypothesis: firms with higher cash levels are more likely to take a higher value
for an external acquisition program.
Based on the agency problem and Jenson’s (1988) free cash flow theory, managers with 
excess cash flow may have the incentive to invest in projects with negative net present values, 
rather than paying back to shareholders. This conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers over payout policy is more severe when substantial cash is generated. Moreover, 
the fi*ee cash flow theory also states that M&A are likely to destroy rather than create value; 
acquisition is the evidence for the conflict of interests and is used as a route for managers to 
spend cash rather than paying it back. Thus a positive relationship between firms’ cash level 
and their acquisition level and action is predicted. Two measurements of cash level are used 
in the model. One is the ratio of cash to total assets (generally called Cash Hypothesis in 
M&A literature); the other is current ratio (Current Ratio).
B. Leverage hypothesis: firms with higher leverage are less likely to carry out or take a lesser
value in an external acquisition program.
According to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) financial slack theory, value is created when a 
slack rich firm combines with a slack poor one; financial slack is the sum of cash in hand and
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures. Vol. 12. Ixs. 4 91
unused debt capacity. This means that firms with low financial leverage may be able to 
create value when acquiring firms with high financial leverage, because bidders can pursue 
the profitable but untoded investment opportunities fi*om the targets and realize financial 
synergy A low leverage signals higher unused debt capacity. So we expect a negative 
relation between firms’ leverage and acquisition level and action. Leverage is presented by 
the ratio of total debt to total assets (D/A).
C. Firm size hypothesis: Larger firms are more likely to carry out or take a larger value in an
external acquisition program.
Larger firms often have greater incentives for acquisition as they are able to realize the 
operating synergies resulting fi*om the economies of scales or scope. Moreover, these firms 
also have more efficiency and financial resources to acquire other firms (Trahan and Shawky 
(1992); Kumar and Rajib (2007)). This supposes that a larger firm will have a higher 
probability of being a bidder and will take a higher value in an acquisition program. Firm 
size is proxied by total assets (FirmSize).
D. Internal investment hypothesis: if a firm invests heavily in internal growth, it is less likely
to carry out or take a lesser value in an external acquisition program
If cash were to be paid out as dividends or invested in internal growth, acquisition 
activities would be rare. The internal investment proxy used is the fixed assets (FixAssets), 
including equipment, plant, properties and other long-term assets, as the percentage of total 
assets (Trahan and Shawky (1992)). The natural prediction is that a higher fixed asset ratio 
firm will have more difficulties in financing an acquisition activity, so there is a negative 
relation to the takeover action or lesser amount in the action.
E Management performance (or profitability) hypothesis: firms with superior management
are more likely to carry out or take a larger value in an external acquisition program.
Based on Jensen (1986), acquisitions will lead to improved performance, if the managers 
are able to maximize the value of corporate assets, which is indeed a function of their 
previous history of performance. Thus, acquirers - or more aggressive acquirers - should 
indicate superior accounting performance compared with that of non-acquirers. Under this 
hypothesis, a positive sign on the performance coefficients is predicted. Return on assets 
(ROA) and net profit margin (NPM) are utilized as the accounting measures for management 
performance.
In addition to these financial characteristics, several dummy variables are added into the 
model; these are payment method (PMT, 1 for cash and 0 for others), acquisition type 
(AcqType, 1 for equity acquisition and 0 for others) and subsidiary acquisition (SubAcq, 1 for 
subsidiary acquisition and 0 for not).
IV. Empirical Results
Table I provides the distribution of sample firms in various industry sectors. Although the 
Conglomerates category has the most acquisition announcements, these firms are not from 
any one sector in particular, but in China the most frequent acquisition announcements (about 
6% of all in the sample period) happened in the Chemical industry sector. All of the 27 listed 
specific industry sectors contain at least 10 acquisition announcements (more than 1.3%), 
which shows that such an event is not limited to a small number of industries.
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Table II provides the basic statistics for these acquisitions by announcement year. It 
reveals that acquisitions occurred mainly between 2003 and 2005, and 42% (319 deals) 
happened in 2004. However, deals occurred rarely in 2001, 2002 and 2006.
This could well be explained by the time of implementation of some new government 
poHcies, and some natural events which happened in the period. At the beginning of 2001, 
joining the WTO was considered to have been a stimulus to the third M&A wave to China. 
However, in July of that year, the Chinese government issued a clause which was aimed to 
reduce the proportion of nationally owned shares to allow more shares to be freely traded in 
the capital market. This clause greatly increased the number of shares available for trading, 
and thus caused a market depression. Hence only a small number of acquisition were 
announced in 2001. From 2002 to the beginning of 2003, the outbreak of SARS caused a big 
scare for the health of people and the event significantly reduced business activities (including 
acquisitions) in China. After July 2003, when the government announced that the threat of 
SARS was over, the Chinese economy started to recover, which caused a rapid increase in the 
number of acquisitions which reached a peak in 2004. In May 2005, the Chinese government 
decided to implement a reform of share ownership division, and again this policy caused a 
decrease in acquisition activities. In total, the deal value during the 6 years was 202.49 billion 
Yuan (US $25.3 billion, much greater than that in the second merger wave of US$5.27 billion). 
Most transactions were paid for in cash (97%); only 21 out of 762 deals being financed by 
equity. Furthermore, this indicates that more than 70% of bidders chose to acquire their 
target’s equity rather than assets; this phenomenon continues to occur each year.
Table III presents the characteristics of the acquiring firms at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcements. It shows that bidders’ average total assets are 3,513 million, the 
mean purchasing value is 266 million and the mean relative size (acquired asset/acquirer asset) 
is about 22%. The median relative size is about 6%, which means that about half of the 
acquiring ratio is less than 6%, thus the acquisitions in the sample are mostly small in size.
For acquirers’ operating and financial ratios, the mean value of current ratio is 1.52, and 
cash is only 0.06% of the total assets, which does not suggest a high liquidity. However, 
bidders have a low debt to assets ratio (23.84%), indicating that their unused debt capacity is 
high. They also show a high net-profit-margin (76.25%), but a low ROA (1.94%). The fixed 
assets account for 41.16% of the total assets.
Table IV shows the correlation matrix of bidders’ characteristic variables. Most of them 
are not highly correlated with each other (less than 0.15 in absolute value). The only two 
noticeable pairs are Liquidity vs. Debt-to-assets ratio, and Debt-to-assets vs. ROA; their 
correlation coefficients equal -0.5 and -0.25 respectively, which indicates that Chinese firms 
with a higher debt ratio are more likely to be associated with a weaker liquidity condition and 
lower operating profit.
In order to investigate the acquiring behavior of a firm, we first use the popular Logit 
model to explain the difference between acquirers and non-acquirers. For that purpose, we 
have composed a comparable list of firms from the Chinese market. For each acquiring 
announced sample firm, we select another firm in the same industry sector with similar asset 
size, with no acquiring plan announced.
Table V compares the financial characteristics for 713 bidders with 713 non-acquiring 
firms by means of a Logit probability model. These two groups have similar total asset values 
(because of the sampling method used for non-acquiring firms), and so the coefficient on size 
variable is non-significant. The major conclusion we can draw from the table is that the fixed
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asset ratio plays an important role in explaining the difference between acquirers and 
non-acquirers. The relation is positive at a 10% significance level for five out of six 
sub-periods, or for the whole period with an exception in 2006. This means that bidders tend 
to have higher proportions of fixed assets than do non-bidders. The fixed assets can be a 
proxy for either internal investment (more capital investment) or a firm’s financial condition 
(security for debt capacity). The positive coefficient is not consistent with the internal 
investment hypothesis but it is consistent with financial capacity prediction. Beyond the fixed 
assets variable, the second interesting one is Net-profit-margin. The coefficient for the whole 
period is significantly negative and is negative also in each sub-period, but most are not 
statistically significant. The acquirers are those with lower profit margin compared with the 
non-acquirers; the result is actually a contradiction of the management hypothesis suggested 
above.
In the above Logit model test we cannot test the relation to the firm’s size because of the 
sampling method. In the following tests, we use our proposed dependent variable of acquired 
size and relative size ratio as the proxies for takeover capacity. The model is discussed in the 
foregoing section and the results are reported in Table VI.
Regressions (1) and (2) are the results obtained using the logarithm of acquired value as 
the indicator for acquiring capacity, and regressions (3) and (4) are the results with relative 
size as the dependent variable. The same variables are used in regressions (1) and (2) except 
for size, and the same comparison between regression (3) and regression (4) on the size 
variable. It is interesting to note that both coefficients for size in regression (2) and regression 
(4) are statistically significant at the 1% level; but in opposite directions. The positive 
coefficient in regression (2) indicates that a larger acquirer will usually take a larger target 
value; and the negative sign for the coefficient in regression (4) shows that a larger acquirer 
usually takes an acquisition in a smaller percentage relative to its own size. The first result has 
frequently been reported in the past (not exactly the same as our results, since we used a 
different dependent variable) and the second result has not been reported previously. We can 
interpret these as positive size capacity but negative incremental size capacity when the 
acquirer is enlarged. Equally, if two smaller firms are combined into a larger firm, the larger 
firm will acquire a smaller value than the total value which could have been acquired by the 
two smaller firms. The conclusion is contradictory to the co-insurance effect of combining 
two smaller firms; because the combined firm has less financial risk and lower financial costs.
We recognize that there is potentially a problem of spurious relation in testing regression 
(4) because the acquirer size used in the denominator of the dependent variable is also one of 
the independent variables. We do not specifically test the spurious problem, but we can still 
draw some conclusions for the regression results based upon the observation that the results 
for other independent variables are generally consistent in regression (1) compared with 
regression (2), and in regressions (3) compared with regression (4). The first conclusion we 
can draw is about the cash ratio. The positive significant coefficients in all four regressions 
tell us that cash is significantly related to an acquirer’s capacity to take acquisitions. A larger 
cash reserve ratio will support a larger size acquisition in market value and a larger target 
percentage relative to its own asset value. If a firm’s cash is increased by 1%, the acquisition 
size could rise on average by more than 1.4 million Yuan or 0.6% of the acquirer value, which 
strongly supports the liquidity hypothesis. The positive relation is not observed in another 
liquidity variable of current ratio.
Another interesting result is the significant (at the 1% level) positive relation in the
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relative size regressions (3 and 4) of the total fixed assets ratio. On average, 1% increase in an 
acquirer’s fixed asset will increase the relative target size ratio by 0.6. Although the same is 
not observed in the purchased value regressions (1) and (2), the same positive relation is 
observed in the Logit model shown in Table (V). The positive relation for the fixed asset ratio 
is in the opposite direction from the internal investment hypothesis. The result could be 
explained by the reason that higher fixed assets may serve as financial collateral and thus 
higher financial capacity
The results for the other hypothesized variables do not show any consistent or significant 
relations. The leverage and management performance hypotheses are not supported by the 
study results.
Additionally we have the acquisition type, payment method and subsidiary acquisition 
dummies as additional control variables in the regression models of Table VI. The results 
show that the coefficients on the first two dummies are statistically significant for both target 
size and relative size regressions. They suggest that the acquisition size and relative ratio are 
relatively smaller if the acquisition is paid for in cash instead of equity and if the acquired is 
equity instead of asset. The results indicate that firms taking over by cash payment are 
generally less aggressive in terms of relative takeover ratios. Consistent behavior is also 
observed for the type of acquisition; firms are less aggressive in acquiring targets’ equity than 
in acquiring their other types of assets (such as total assets or fixed assets only). Whether 
acquisition type is subsidiary or not is not statistically important in explaining the acquisition 
size.
In a summary of the empirical tests on firms’ acquiring capacity, we have observed a 
significant positive size effect. The larger an acquirer’s size, the greater the target value it may 
take over. We have also observed a negative relative ratio effect; a larger firm will take over a 
smaller ratio of target relative to its own size. The results indicate that an increase in a firm’s 
size will not proportionally increase its acquiring capacity; the marginal capacity will 
decrease. Similar result is not seen in the previous literature for this negative effect; and this is 
our unique contribution to the literature. Another significant relation is observed for the cash 
ratio level. A higher cash ratio is associated with a larger target measured in both value and 
relative ratio. The level of cash is consistently related to a firm’s acquiring capacity, which is 
consistent with the cash hypothesis (or liquidity hypothesis).
It is also interesting to note that the method of payment indicates a firm’s acquiring 
capacity. If a takeover is announced with cash payment, it is usually associated with a smaller 
target in both market value and target value ratio. In interpretation of this result we are 
cautious because the great majority (97%) of our cases were settled in cash. The results might 
be explained by the observation made by Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007). When they examine 
the impact of bid characteristics on performance they found that acquisition transactions paid 
with cash and larger targets are associated with superior performance.
The other operational (return on asset and net profit margin) and financial variables (debt 
ratio) do not provide any observable relation to the target size in either absolute value or 
relative ratio terms. We may explain that for many Chinese takeover activities there is less 
operational consideration, thus it seems that it is affordability and regulatory or policy issues 
that play important roles in these acquisitions. This phenomenon is usually popular in a 
developing country such as China.
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V. Conclusion and discussions
This study was designed to investigate the acquiring capacity of a firm which is expressed 
as a function of its operational and financial variables. The proxy used for the acquiring 
capacity is the targets’ market values expressed in the announcement made by the acquirers. 
We used both absolute target value and target ratio (relative to the acquirer value) in the 
investigation.
Our regression results show strong significant positive relation to the acquirer’s firm size. 
These Chinese firms could significantly increase their acquiring power by increasing their 
own sizes. Probably this explains part of the reason why the merging waves occurred in China; 
those firms had the chance of increasing their acquiring capacity by acquisition. This 
explanation of merging wave could be an alternative to the principal-agent theory and market 
timing theory. This is similar to the theory of the prisoner’s dilemma: when merging firms’ 
improvement in acquiring capacity is sufficiently large, the non-acquiring firms may have a 
higher risk of being taken over. To avoid this situation more firms are involved in the tides. 
Thus the merging wave resembles a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma: each individual chooses to 
merge despite the fact that their combined firm value is lowered by this action. This result is 
also consistent with the principal-agent theory, management can avoid being replaced by 
others by increasing their acquiring power through acquiring others first.
The size effect discovered in the test is not simply a repetition of the past because in our 
model we used a unique measure which has not been applied before. In past research the 
dummy variable has been used to compare the difference between acquirers and non-acquirers; 
this study is the first in which target size has been used as an indicator to measure the 
difference in the degree of acquisition. The question is about which major characters of a firm 
influence the level of a takeover action. To enable consideration to be given to this, the size 
effect developed in the study is actually an extension of the past results. Larger firms usually 
have higher probability of performing takeover action. Additionally, they have a tendency to 
take a larger target. A firm can increase its takeover capacity by increasing its own size, but 
the increased capacity will be diminishing with smaller incremental capacity.
We have also discovered in the study that the cash reserve ratio of an acquirer firm is 
significantly positively related to the size of target firm it will take over. This relation is true 
when the target size is measured in a relative ratio to the acquirer value. Chinese firms with a 
high cash ratio tend to choose a larger target in their acquisition.
The motivations and dynamics of merging and acquisition could be evolving over time, 
and theories developed to explain the behavior need to be updated from time to time. We hope 
the results reported here will serve this purpose.
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Table I
Sample Firms Distribution in Industry Sectors
The sample observations are collected from available public acquisition announcements in the years 2001 to 
2006. The industry sectors are classified in terms of the CSMAR database.
Sector No. o f  Acquisition 
(%)
Conglomerates 75 (9.84)
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 47 (6.17)
Medicine Manufacturing 45 (5.91)
Production and Supply of Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water 43 (5.64)
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 40 (5.25)
Estate Development and Operation 32 (4.20)
Retail Trade 25 (3.28)
Textile 24 (3.15)
Non-metallic Mineral Products 24 (3.15)
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 24 (3.15)
Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 24 (3.15)
Special Equipment Manufacturing 22 (2.89)
Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 17 (2.23)
Computer Application Service 17 (2.23)
Support Service for Transportation 16 (2.10)
Food Processing 15 (1.97)
Trade Brokers and Agents 14 (1.84)
Paper and Allied Products 13 (1.71)
General Machinery Manufacturing 13 (1.71)
Other Manufacturing 12 (1.57)
Agriculture 11 (1.44)
Beverage Production 11 (1.44)
Garment and Other Fabric Products Manufacturing 11 (1.44)
You Se Metal Ye Lian Ji Ya Yan Jia Industry 11 (1.44)
Tourism 11 (1.44)
Electronic Components and Appliance 10 (1.31)
Instruments and Appearances, Culture and Office Machinery 10 (1.31)
Manufacturing 
Public Facilities Services 10 (1.31)
Others 135 (17.72)
Total 762 (100.00)
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Table II
Distribution of Acquisition by Announcement Year
The acquisition percentage is relative to the total number of observations made in the sample period. All 
information was collected from acquisition announcements in the sample period.
Year No. of 
Acquisition 
and (%)
Total deal 
value
Average 
deal value
Cash
payment
(%)
Equity
acquisition
%(million) (million)
2001 16 (2.10 ) 2391 149 93.8 37.5
2002 1 (0.13) 410 410 100.0 100.0
2003 194 (25.46 ) 25478 131 97.9 69.1
2004 319 (41.86) 103710 325 96.9 78.47
2005 170 (22.31 ) 38004 224 99.4 70.0
2006 62 (8.14 ) 32491 524 91.9 75.8
Total 762 (100.00) 202485 266 97.2 73.1
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Table III 
Acquiring Firm Characteristics
The first two variables are used as dependent variables in the regressions and the others 
are independent variables
Mean Media Std
Total Acquirer Asset(million) 3,513 1,505 8,313
Purchasing value (million) 266 45 1,627
Relative Size% 22.28 6.08 24.17
Current ratio 1.52 1.28 0.97
Cash% 0.06 0.01 10.04
D/A% 23.84 23.70 14.88
Acquirer Size 21.24 21.13 1.00
Net-profit-margin% 76.25 77.81 65.12
ROA% 1.94 2.84 3.14
T otaLfixed_assets% 41.16 32.60 59.71
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Table IV 
Correlation Matrixes
Current
Ratio
Cash
%
D/A
%
Acq’er
Size
N-P-M
%
ROA
%
TFA
%
Current ratio 1.00
Cash% -0.01 1.00
D/A% -0.50 0.02 1.00
Acquirer Size -0.14 0.09 0.07 1.00
Net-profit-margin% 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02 1.00
ROA% 0.14 0.12 -0.25 0.10 -0.04 1.00
Total Fixed Assets% -0.08 -0.10 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 1.00
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Table V
Logit Regression Results on Acquisition Probability
The dependent variable takes a value of lif  the firm has announced an acquisition plan and a value of 0 for a 
comparable firm with no acquisition announcement. The Logit regression is applied to the following model: 
Probability (acquisition) = F {Liquidity, Cash, D/A, FirmSize, NPM, ROA, FixAssets) ( 1 )
whole 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
Current ratio -0.06 2.21 -0.17 0.03 -0.17 -0.11
Cash
(0.20)
-0.31
(0.28)
-8.3
(0.18)
0.18
(0.72)
-1.77
(0.13)
-1.39
(0.54)
2.64
D/A
(0.53)
-0.27
(0.25)
36.7
(0.85)
-0.66
(0.04)
0.32
(0.26)
-0.8
(0.08)
-1.85
Acquirer Size
(0.48)
-0.06
(0.11)
0.02
(0.38)
-0.07
(0.59)
-0.05
(0.39)
-0.03
(0.22)
0.25
Net-profit-margin
(0.89)
-0.22
(0.98)
-31.62
(0.48)
-0.08
(0.59)
-0.21
(0.80)
-0.3
(0.26)
-0.25
ROA
(0.06)
0.72
(0.04)
65.09
(0.67)
-0.07
(0.22)
1.91
(0.30)
2.70
(0.54)
3.15
Fixed asset
(0.16)
1.09
(0.16)
13.09
(0.90)
1.23
(0.08)
1.19
(0.08)
1.02
(0.18)
-0.35
(0.00) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.74)
R-Square 2% 58.86% 1.63% 2.59% 5.42% 8.62%
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Table VI
OLS Regression Results on the Market Value of Acquisition
Acquiring Capacity (Acquired Size or Acquired Value to Acquirer Value Ratio)
= a  + Pi CurrentRatio + P2 Cash + p3 (D/A) + P4 FirmSize 
+ p5 NPM + p6 ROA + P7 FixAssets + Acquire Type Dummies (2)
Ln(purchased value) Relative Ratio
1 2 3 4
Coeff P-V Coeff P-V Coeff P-V Coeff P-V
Current ratio -0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.78 -0.01 0.88 -0.02 -0.65
Cash 1.81 0.00 1.42 0.02 0.58 0.05 0.63 0.03
D/A -0.17 0.72 -0.29 0.52 0.40 0.08 0.42 0.07
Net-profit-margin 0.07 0.46 0.04 0.66 0.03 0.55 0.03 0.50
ROA% -0.37 0.39 -0.83 0.04 0.10 0.62 0.15 0.45
T otal_fixed_assets -0.05 0.66 0.03 0.74 0.67 <.0001 0.66 0.00
Acquisition type -0.66 <.0001 -0.66 0.00 -0.19 0.00 -0.19 0.00
Payment -1.77 <.0001 -1.59 0.00 -0.58 0.00 -0.60 0.00
Subsidiary acq -0.49 0.06 -0.41 0.10 -0.12 0.33 -0.13 0.29
Acquirer Size 0.58 0.00 -0.07 0.00
Adjusted-R-square 0.06 0.17 0.22 0.22
